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Section 59(1) of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998 authorises the Competition Tribunal 
to impose administrative penalties on firms who have committed prohibited forms of 
anti-competitive conduct, for example a penalty of R45 million was imposed on South 
African Airways (Pty) Ltd for abuse of dominance and a penalty of R98 784 869.90 
was imposed on Tiger Consumer Brands (Pty) Ltd for price fixing.1 This paper will 
consider whether the interest expenditure incurred by a company, which raises a loan 
in order to pay such a penalty, would be deductible in terms of the general case law 
on the deductibility of interest or in terms of section 24J(2) of the Income Tax Act, 58 
of 1962 (“the Act”). 
The types of offences that attract Competition Penalties include price-fixing, 
abuse of dominance, cartels etc.  
‘Cartels are particularly a damaging form of anticompetitive agreement often 
resulting in price increases that are harmful to consumers of goods or services 
concerned. Not only does such activity affect consumer welfare, but it also 
hinders development and innovation in the industries within which this 
activity occurs.’2 
 
 In it’s most recent decision regarding a bread cartel involving Pioneer Food Group, 
the Competition Tribunal stated that ‘hard core cartel activities are considered to be 
the most egregious offences under the Competition Act and, absent mitigating factors, 
deserve the maximum penalty provided for in the Act’.3 
Taxable income is determined by calculating gross income, as defined, from 
which exempt income is deducted, resulting in the amount of income (as defined in 
section 1 of the Act). Allowable deductions are then deducted from income in order to 
calculate the amount of taxable income.   
                                                   
1 Joe van Dorsten “The Tax Implications of Competition Penalties” Taxpayer vol 58 
no 8 at 142 
2 Competition Commission South Africa, “Corporate Leniency Policy” available at 















Generally, in order for expenditure to be deductible it must meet the 
requirements of section 11(a) read with section 23(g) of the Act, unless a specific 
provision provides for its deduction. Section 11(a) requires expenditure to be 
‘actually incurred in the production of income, provided such expenditure is not of a 
capital nature’ while section 23(g) requires that the expenditure will not be deductible  
‘to the extent to which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the purposes of 
trade’.   
According to section 23B(3) of the Act: 
‘No deduction shall be allowed under s 11(a) in respect of any expenditure or 
loss of a type for which a deduction or allowance may be granted under any 
other provision of this Act, notwithstanding that –  
(a) such other provision may impose any limitation on the amount of the such 
deduction or allowance; or 
(b) that deduction or allowance in terms of that other provision may be 
granted in a different year of assessment.’ (check this in new act and 
insert footnote) 
 
As a result of section 23B(3) one must turn to section 24J when discussing the 
deductibility of interest.  
In 2005, section 24J of the Act was amended to make provision for the 
deductibility of interest expenditure. Previously it had merely been a timing provision, 
which regulated the amount of interest that could be deducted in each year of 
assessment while the interest was still deductible in terms of section 11(a).4 Interest 
must now be deducted in terms of section 24J (2), which reads as follows: 
 
‘(2) Where any person is the issuer in relation to an instrument during any 
year of assessment, such person shall for the purposes of this Act be 
deemed to have incurred an amount of interest during such year of 
assessment, which is equal to –  
(a) the sum of all accrual amounts in relation to all accrual periods 
falling, whether in whole or in part, within such year of assessment 
in respect of such instrument; or 
                                                   














(b) an amount determined in accordance with an alternative method in 
relation to such year of assessment in respect of such instrument, 
which must be deductible from the income of that person derived 
from carrying on any trade if that amount is incurred in the 
production of income.’5 
 
Thus for section 24J(2) to apply there must be an “issuer” and an “instrument”. An 
issuer is defined as: 
‘in relation to any instrument –  
(a) any person who has incurred any interest or has any obligation to repay 
any amount in terms of such instrument; or 
(b) at any particular time, means any person who, if any interest payable in 
terms of such instrument was due and payable at that time, would be liable 
to pay such interest.’ 
and an instrument “means any form of interest-bearing arrangement, whether in 
writing or not…’  
 
Interest is defined in section 24J to ‘include the  
(a) gross amount of any interest or related finance charges, discount or premium 
payable or receivable in terms of or in respect of a financial arrangement; 
(b) amount (or portion thereof) payable by a borrower to the lender in terms of 
any lending arrangement as represents compensation for any amount to which 
the lender would, but for such lending arrangement,  have been entitled; and 
(c) absolute value of the difference between all amounts receivable and payable 
by a person in terms of a sale and leaseback arrangement as contemplated in 
section 23G throughout the full term of such arrangement, to which such 
person is a party…’ 
 
As is the case in section 11(a) read with section 23(g), section 24J(2) requires 
that the interest expenditure be derived from trade and incurred in the production of 
income. However, there is no requirement in section 24J(2) that the expenditure must 
not be of a capital nature. The case law on the trade requirement and the production of 
income under section 11(a) would therefore still be relevant in determining the 
deductibility of interest under section 24J(2). 
 
 
                                                   














“In the production of income” 
 
The case of Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue6 considered the “in the production of income” inquiry. The taxpayer was a 
company that was in the transport business. One of the company’s employees was 
injured while driving a tram during the course of his employment. The company 
unsuccessfully resisted a claim for damages and was obliged to pay compensation to 
the widow of the driver, who had subsequently died. The taxpayer sought to deduct 
both the damages and the legal fees incurred in resisting the claim for damages. 
Discussing how to determine whether an expense is “in the production of income”, 
the court in the PE Electric Tramways case stated that: 
‘all expenses attached to the performance of a business operation bona fide 
performed for the purpose of earning income are deductible whether such 
expenses are necessary for its performance or attached to it by chance or are 
bona fide incurred for the more efficient performance of such operation 
provided they are so closely connected with it that they may be regarded as 
part of the cost of performing it.’7 
 
Thus, the test for whether expenditure is in the production of income involves a two 
part inquiry. Firstly, the act to which the expenditure is attached must be performed in 
the production of income. Secondly, the expenditure must be so closely linked to the 
act referred to above that it can be regarded as part of the cost of performing it.8 The 
court held that the damages were deductible as the underlying act to which the 
expenditure was attached was the employment of drivers and this was a necessary 
component of the taxpayer’s business. The court went on to say that there was an 
inevitable possibility, in the employment of drivers, that potential liability may arise 
for any injury incurred during the course of their employment. As a result the 
                                                   
6 1936 CPD 241 
7 at 246 














damages expenditure was deductible. With regard to the legal costs, the court held 
that resisting the claim for damages, that being the underlying act, was not done for 
the purpose of earning income. The legal costs were held not to be in the production 
of income and not deductible.  
The underlying act for interest expenditure on a loan to pay a competition 
penalty would be the competition activity, such as price fixing. This would clearly be 
done with the intention or purpose of earning income. So it appears that it would meet 
the first requirement of the test. The next question is whether the interest paid on a 
loan acquired in order to pay such penalty is closely linked enough to be ‘regarded as 
part of the cost of performing it’9. If one looks at it from this perspective it seems that 
the interest on the loan would not be closely enough linked to the underlying act. The 
interest relates to the loan, which relates to the penalty, which relates to an unlawful 
act, which was in the production of income. The link does not seem to be such a close 
one.  
In the case of Joffe and Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR10 the taxpayer wanted to deduct 
expenditure in the form of damages and legal costs which it incurred as a result of 
being found negligent in the death of a contractor who was employed by them. The 
taxpayer was in the business of reinforced concrete engineering. The company 
supplied the steel reinforcement for a cantilever hood. The hood subsequently 
collapsed and killed a plumber who had been working below. The Court held that 
both expenditure necessarily attached to the performance of income earning 
operations, as well as expenditure incurred bona fide for the purpose of performing 
income earning operations was deductible but only if it was expended wholly and 
exclusively for the purposes of trade and was not of a capital nature. The Court held 
                                                   
9 PE Electric Tramways at 456 














that it not been shown that the negligence and subsequent liability for damages were 
necessary concomitants of the income earning operations of the company and that, as 
a result, neither the damages nor the legal costs were deductible.   
The same principles were applied in PE Electric Tramways and Joffe’s case. 
In the first case the possibility of liability for damages was seen to be necessarily 
attached to the business of the taxpayer in the sense that it is a very real and possible 
expectation that accidents might occur from time to time in the transport business and 
liability for damages may arise. The Court in Joffe’s case took the view that 
negligence can never be considered to give rise to deductible expenditure. This view 
was largely based on public policy considerations.  
With regard to interest arising out of a loan to pay competition penalties, the 
difference is that in most cases which come before the Competition Tribunal, the 
business would in fact have chosen to run it’s business in a way which would fall foul 
of the Competition Act in order to improve it’s production of income. It is 
conceivable that, like the Court in Joffe’s case with regard to the negligence, a court 
may be reluctant to allow a deduction of interest for public policy reason. It will be 
argued below that the interest would be deductible as it is not so closely linked to the 
unlawful act so as to be tainted by it’s unlawfulness, and that the reason for the loan 
which incurs interest is not directly the unlawful act. However, if there were to be any 
public policy reason to disallow the deduction of interest, which would otherwise be 
deductible, it is submitted that it should be reserved for the most serious of offences 
under the Competition Act. As was mentioned above, cartel activities are considered 














penalty that is provided for in the Act. In the case of  Competition Commission v 
Pioneer Foods11 the Competition Tribunal stated in it’s decision that  
‘Hard core cartels, as contemplated in section 4(1)(b) of the Act are per se 
offences. There is no need for the Commission to show any anti-competitive 
effects and there are no justification grounds available to respondents. So 
egregious an offence is this, that harm to competition and harm to consumers 
is presumed by its mere existence. Moreover the extent of loss suffered or 
damage caused is presumed to be extensive’12 
  
It is therefore submitted that, if there were any possibility that the interest 
could be disallowed as a deduction by reason of the underlying offence which gave 
rise to the penalty, only the most serious offences, such as cartel activities could 
possibly lead to the disallowance of the deduction. However, as will be argued below, 
it is submitted that the interest would, nevertheless, be deductible.  
 
 
The Trade Requirement 
 
Most of the case law on section 23(g) deals with the section before it was amended 
in1993. Prior to this amendment, expenditure had to be wholly and exclusively for 
purposes of trade in order to be deductible. The amended section provides that 
expenditure is not deductible to the extent that it is not laid out for the purposes of 
trade. This allows for an apportionment where particular expenditure is laid out partly 
for purposes of trade and partly for some other purpose. The cases dealing with the 
old section are, however, still relevant as they deal with what constitutes a trade 
purpose and what does not constitute a trade purpose.  
In general expenditure that is laid out for purposes of making a profit will 
always be considered to be for purposes of trade. However,  
                                                   
11 Case No 15/CR/Feb07 at 148 














‘the absence of a profit does not necessarily exclude a transaction from being 
part of the taxpayer’s trade…Where, however, a trader normally carries on 
business by buying goods and selling them at a profit, then as a general rule a 
transaction entered into with the purpose of not making a profit, or in fact 
registering a loss, must, in order to satisfy s 23(g), be shown to have been so 
connected with the pursuit of the taxpayer’s trade, e.g. on ground of 
commercial expediency or indirect facilitation of the trade, as to justify the 
conclusion that, despite the lack of profit motive, the moneys paid out under 
the transaction were wholly and exclusively for the purposes of trade’.13 
 
The nature of a competition penalty is such that it would almost always be considered 
to be for the purposes of trade, at least to some extent. When it comes to the interest, 
the trade requirement would most likely be fulfilled, depending on the circumstances. 
Here, one starts by looking at the purpose of the loan that gave rise to the interest. 
Why did the company take out a loan thereby incurring liability to pay interest? The 
reason for this would almost always be that competition penalties are so high that 
most companies would be unable to pay them out of liquid funds. If the company is to 
continue trading after paying the penalty, it is likely that it will need a loan in order to 
retain enough liquid funds for the normal running of it’s business.  
 
 
Deductibility of interest generally 
 
In Financier v COT14, the court held that the test for the deductibility of interest on 
money borrowed was ‘the purpose for which the money was borrowed’.15 Even if the 
money borrowed is ultimately used for an investment, which does not produce taxable 
income, the court held that if the money was borrowed for good and sufficient reasons 
for use in the business, that the interest is still tax deductible.16 Thus the eventual use 
to which the money borrowed is put, is not the decisive factor. It is the purpose for the 
                                                   
13 De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1986 (1) SA 8 (A), 47 SATC 229 
14 1950 (3) SA 293 (SR), 17 SATC 405 















loan that is decisive, although the ultimate use may be helpful in ascertaining the 
purpose of the borrowing.17  
The court in CIR v Allied Building Society18 agreed with this view, stating that 
in ‘determining the purpose of the borrowing, the ultimate user of the money may, no 
doubt, in certain cases be a relevant factor; but the dominant question remains: what 
was the true nature of the transaction?’19 
It therefore seems reasonable that where a company regularly accepts loans in 
the daily running of their business and one of such loans or part thereof is then used to 
extinguish the liability to pay competition penalties, that the interest on such 
borrowed money would be deductible because if one looks to the purpose of 
borrowing the money, it was a legitimate business purpose, in the production of 
income. The fact that the money is ultimately used for something else does not alter 
this purpose.20  
However, complex question to decide is whether the interest on money 
borrowed specifically for the purpose of paying competition penalties would be 
deductible, where the penalties themselves are not deductible. 
 
Deductibility of Competition Penalties 
 
Before reaching a conclusion about the deductibility of interest, as is the purpose of 
this paper, it may be helpful to consider whether the actual competition penalties 
themselves would constitute deductible expenditure. 
                                                   
17 David Clegg Income Tax in South Africa at 
http://butterworths.uct.ac.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates$fn=defaul
t.htm$vid=mylnb:10.1048/enu  
18 (4) SA 1 (A), 25 SATC 343 
19 CIR v Allied Building Society (4) SA 1 (A), 25 SATC 343 at [13] 














Policy considerations are a factor to be considered and count against the 
deductibility of penalties imposed by the Competition Tribunal. In the Port Elizabeth 
Tramway21 case Watermeyer CJ stated that where an act is ‘unlawful or negligent and 
the attendant expense is occasioned by the unlawfulness or, possibly, the negligence 
of the act, then probably it would not be deductible’.22  
In ITC 119923 Margo J stated that when considering an income producing 
transaction, which constitutes unlawful behaviour, one must differentiate between the 
business operation and the unlawful behaviour, which is committed coincidentally to 
the business operation. He goes on to say that the ‘nature and character of a fine as a 
punishment exacted by the State are such that it could not properly, naturally or 
reasonably be regarded as part of the cost of performing the business operation’.24  
Melamet J in ITC 149025 stated that ‘to allow fines imposed for an infraction 
of the law to be deducted as an expense…would be contrary to public policy in that it 
would frustrate the legislative intent and allow a punishment imposed to be 
diminished or lightened’.26 The purpose of the penalties imposed by the Competition 
Tribunal is that they should be ‘sufficiently high to deter repetition of 
contraventions’27. If such penalties were then allowed to be deducted from a 
taxpayer’s taxable income, this would reduce the deterrent effect of the penalty. 28 
In addition to the policy reasons why fines and penalties should not be 
deductible, section 23(o) of the Act specifically provides that expenditure which 
                                                   
21 Port Elizabeth Tramway Co Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1936 CPD 241 
at 245 - 6 
22 Ibid  
23 (1973) 36 SATC 16 (T) at 20 – 21 
24 Ibid 
25 (1990) 53 SATC 108 (T) 
26 ITC 1490 (1990) 53 SATC 108 (T) at 113-114 















constitutes ‘a fine charged or penalty imposed as a result of an unlawful activity’ will 
not be allowed as a deduction. 
Thus competition penalties, for various reasons, would not be deductible from 
taxable income. The question still remains, however, whether interest on money 
borrowed in order to pay such penalties would be deductible. 
It has been held that the interest on money borrowed with the purpose of 
acquiring shares will normally not be deductible due to the fact that shares produce 
dividend income which is exempt and therefore does not form part of income, as 
defined, in the hands of the taxpayer.29 
In CIR v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd30 the court set out certain 
principles to be applied in determining the deductibility of interest on money 
borrowed. These include: 
‘(1) Generally, in deciding whether moneys outlaid by a taxpayer constitute 
expenditure incurred in the production of the income (in terms of the 
general deduction formula) important and sometimes overriding 
factors are the purpose of the expenditure and what the expenditure 
actually effects; and in this regard the closeness of the connection 
between the expenditure and the income-earning operations must be 
assessed… (my emphasis) 
(2)  More specifically, in determining whether interest (or other like 
expenditure) incurred by a taxpayer in respect of moneys borrowed for 
use in his business is deductible in terms of the general deduction 
formula and its negative counterpart in the Act, a distinction may in 
certain circumstances have to be drawn between the case where a 
taxpayer borrows a specific sum of money and applies it to an 
identifiable purpose, and the case where, as in the Allied Building 
Society case and the Bank in the present case, the taxpayer borrows 
money generally and upon a large scale in order to raise floating 
capital for use in his (or its) business. 
(3)  In the former type of case both the purpose of the expenditure (in the 
form of interest) and what it actually effects can readily be determined 
and identified: a clear and close causal connection can be traced. Both 
these factors are, therefore, important considerations in determining 
the deductibility of the expenditure. 
                                                   
29 CIR v Drakensberg Garden Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1960 (2) SA 475 (A), 23 SATC 251 














(4)  In the latter type of case, however, and more particularly in the case of 
institutions like the Society and the Bank, there are certain factors, 
which prevent the identification of such a causal connection and one 
cannot say that the expenditure was incurred in order to achieve a 
particular effect. All that one can say is that in a general sense the 
expenditure is incurred in order to provide the institution with the 
capital with which to run its business; but it is not possible to link 
particular expenditure with the various ways in which the capital is in 
turn utilised...the most important factor was the purpose of the 
borrowing.’31 
 
The purpose of the interest expenditure would be to pay a penalty, which the taxpayer 
is legally obligated to pay. If the taxpayer needs or chooses to borrow money in order 
to do what is in fact required by law, the likely reason for this is that without 
borrowing money, and after paying the penalty the taxpayer would have insufficient 
liquid funds in order to perform its income earning operations or that it would 
sometime in the near future have insufficient liquid funds. Thus the purpose of the 
expenditure would relate to the taxpayer’s income earning operations.   
 
 
Application to interest on money borrowed to pay competition penalties 
 
It has been shown above that the Competition Penalties themselves are not deductible 
both due to policy reasons and in terms of section 23(o) of the Act, which prohibits 
the deduction of fines and penalties. The reason for the disallowance of such 
deductions is because the penalties relate to unlawful behaviour. Once the penalty is 
imposed, the company has an obligation to pay such penalties, either out of the 
company’s capital or with borrowed money. The borrowing of money in order to pay 
such a penalty is not itself an unlawful act and would therefore not be affected by 
section 23(o) or the policy considerations discussed above.  
                                                   















        In Ticktin Timbers CC v CIR32  it was held that the  
‘the making of the distribution, on the one hand, and the making of the loan, 
on the other, were not intended to be separate and unconnected transactions. 
They were plainly interdependent and neither was intended to exist without 
the other. It is this linkage which, to my mind, is fatal for appellant’s case for 
it shows that the true reason why appellant had to borrow back at interest from 
Dr Ticktin money which it had in its coffers and was under no obligation to 
part with was because it wanted to make a distribution to Ticktin.’33  
 
This case can be distinguished from the situation being examined in this paper for two 
reasons. The first is that the Ticktin case related to a dividend distribution which was 
the ultimate reason for the non-deductibility of the interest expenditure in that case. 
The second reason is that the taxpayer in the Ticktin case was ‘under no obligation to 
part with’ the money used to make the distribution of dividends. When the 
Competition Tribunal imposes penalties on a taxpayer, the taxpayer is under an 
obligation to part with that money, and the company would have to, in some way, 
ensure that after paying the penalty, it is left with sufficient liquid funds to continue to 
run its business.  
In Commissioner, SARS v BP South Africa (Pty) Ltd34 the court referred to the 
Ticktin case and stated that on the facts of the BP case, it could not be said that 
without the loan there would have been no dividend. There was no need to borrow the 
money in order to declare the dividend, however, ‘it was clear that cash would in the 
future be needed to carry on with the business of BPSA unless the business was to be 
run down. The court held that the purpose of BPSA regarding the loan was ‘to 
continue its income producing activities and that the interest was an expense incurred 
in order to produce income within the meaning of s11(a)’.35 
                                                   
32 1999 (4) SA 939 (SCA) 
33 At [9] 
34 2006 (5) SA 559 (SCA) 














The closeness of the connection between the expenditure and the company’s 
income earning operations must be examined. One must look at the purpose of the 
expenditure and its actual effect. Competition penalties are imposed for prohibited 
activities such as ‘price-fixing; dividing markets and collusive tendering; minimum 
resale price maintenance; where a dominant firm charges excessive prices or engages 
in exclusionary acts; and various merger related contraventions’.36 Despite the 
unlawful nature of the activities to which the interest expenditure relates, such 
activities would clearly have been carried on for the purpose of producing income. 
The purpose of the borrowing of money is to extinguish a debt, which has arisen out 
of the income earning operations of the company carried out in the course of its trade.  
A counter argument would be that because the act to which the expenditure 
relates is unlawful, the interest expenditure that relates to such act is tainted by the 
unlawful act and should not be deductible. The issue here would be whether the 
interest expenditure is far removed enough from the original unlawful act that it can 
be examined separately from the penalty itself. It could be argued that without the 
unlawful conduct of the taxpayer, the penalty would not have been imposed and the 
obligation to pay which led to the borrowing of money and the consequent interest 
expenditure would not have arisen, so the interest expenditure cannot be separated 
from the unlawful conduct. While the interest is most certainly linked to the original 
offence before the competition tribunal, it is not ‘so closely connected’ as to be part of 
the original act. If it were, it would have to be disallowed as a deduction due to the 
unlawfulness of the original underlying act.  That original act, while it may be the first 
in a chain of events leading to the interest expenditure, should not be considered to be 
                                                   














the underlying act to which the expenditure relates. The interest expenditure arises out 
of the taxpayer’s ability to fulfil its obligation to pay the fine.  
The borrowing of money to pay such a penalty is more closely linked to the 
taxpayer’s need to retain liquid funds in the business; funds which are required in 
order to perform its income earning activities. It is submitted that the borrowing of 
money is one step further removed from the unlawful conduct and the interest 
expenditure would therefore relate more to the taxpayer’s ability to pay the penalty 
which it is legally obligated to do, than to the original unlawful act.  
With regard to whether public policy considerations should be taken into 
account when determining the deductibility of interest, it is submitted that allowing 
the interest to be deductible would not lessen the penalty that is imposed nor would it 
lessen the deterrent effect of the penalty, which has been shown to be one of the major 
policy reasons for the imposition of the penalty.  
It would, possibly, be prudent for taxpayer’s faced with penalties imposed by 
the Competition Tribunal to pay such penalties out of the company’s capital and 
subsequently borrow whatever money is needed to carry on its trade and carry out its 
income producing activities. However, it is submitted that, while the question is by no 
means certain, the argument for the deductibility of interest outweighs the argument 
against it. Section 23(o) of the Act does not prohibit the deduction of expenditure that 
relates to a penalty or fine. It only prohibits the deduction of the penalty itself. In 
addition there is no convincing public policy reason why the interest expenditure 
should not be deductible, as doing so would not diminish the punishment in any way. 
The interest reason for the interest expenditure is the company’s ability to pay the fine 
and still be able to continue to carry on its trade and earn income. The interest does 














tainted by such offence. It is submitted that the interest expenditure should be 
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        Double Taxation Agreements (which are concluded between two States to avoid 
the occurrence of double taxation) are increasingly being used as a tax-planning tool 
by residents of a third State which is not party to the relevant Double Taxation 
Agreement. These arrangements are increasingly being used to take advantage of 
more favourable tax dispensations in other jurisdictions in order to reduce or avoid tax 
liability. This often leads to loss of tax revenue for the parties to the Double Taxation 
Agreement.1 The term “beneficial ownership” was inserted into the OECD Model Tax 
Convention in 1977 in an attempt to curb treaty shopping. It is now included in the 
OECD, UN & US Models. Many countries, including South Africa, have incorporated 
this term in their Double Taxation Agreements with other countries. There has been 
much disagreement amongst writers on the subject as to the correct way to interpret 
the term. This paper will look at “beneficial ownership” in the context of treaty 
shopping and discuss the difficulties with the term. 
 
WHAT IS TREATY SHOPPING 
Treaty shopping ‘refers to any intentional effort to structure a transaction so 
that it can harvest the benefits of a particular tax treaty that would otherwise not be 
applicable’.2  This is generally achieved by setting up a conduit company as a resident 
in a State which has a favourable treaty with the source State of the income.3 This 
kind of treaty shopping is done to achieve either the avoidance or reduction of 
withholding taxes in the source State. 
A conduit company ‘is an intermediary company with very narrow powers 
which is used for holding assets or rights as an agent or nominee would on behalf of 
another company’. 4  The conduit company is used to reduce the withholding tax 
imposed on a taxpayer by routing a transaction or arrangement through a jurisdiction 
                                                   
1 Annet Wanyana Oguttu “Curbing ‘treaty shopping’: the ‘beneficial ownership’ provision analysed 
from a South African perspective” (2007) XL CILSA 237 at 237 
2 Sophie Chatel “Treaty Shopping: A Canadian Case Study and the International Scene” at 5 
3 Luc De Broe International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse 
4 Annet Wanyana Oguttu “Curbing ‘treaty shopping’: the ‘beneficial ownership’ provision analysed 













with a favourable tax treaty. The conduit company is used purely for purposes of 
gaining the benefit of a particular tax treaty.  
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One of the reasons why treaty shopping occurs is because of the ‘differences 
in tax relief offered by other countries’ treaties. International investors might thus be 
tempted to look for the most beneficial treaty to take advantage of.6 
It can be debated whether treaty shopping is, per se, wrong. In the case of The 
Queen v Mil (Investments) S.A.7 the court a quo said that the ‘shopping or selection of 
a treaty to minimise tax on its own cannot be viewed as being abusive; it is the use of 
the selected treaty that must be examined…’8 The appeal court in that case remained 
silent on this statement. A distinction must be made between “tax avoidance” and “tax 
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evasion”. Tax avoidance refers to the situation where a taxpayer arranges its affairs in 
such a way as to legitimately pay the least tax possible within the law. ‘This is done 
by utilising loopholes in tax laws and exploiting them within legal parameters’.9 Tax 
evasion on the other hand is an illegal offence, which refers to the use of fraud in 
order to avoid paying tax which the taxpayer is in fact liable to pay. While treaty 
shopping may amount to tax avoidance rather than tax evasion, it is understandable 
that countries would attempt to limit the use of treaty shopping in order to protect 
themselves from loss of tax revenue.  
Article 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention states that the tax treaty only 
applies to ‘persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States’.10 The 
definition of “persons” refers to legal persons as well as natural persons. Treaty 
shopping structures are therefore ‘usually designed to meet the legal requirement of 
residence’ for tax purposes11 in the relevant State in order to fall under the scope of 
the Double Taxation Agreement.  
Treaty shopping is generally considered to be contrary to the object and 
purpose of a tax treaty. A Double Taxation Agreement between two countries is 
designed to benefit residents of the contracting States, to protect them from double 
taxation. To intentionally become a “resident” of a particular State for the sole 
purpose of obtaining a tax benefit through a Double Taxation Agreement would seem 
to be contrary to the purpose of the treaty and could be seen as an abuse of the 
treaty.12 The use of a company that has a legitimate reason for operating in a specific 
jurisdiction, other than to obtain a tax benefit would be less likely to be considered an 
abuse of the treaty. The question is whether the drafters of the treaty intended it to 
apply to ‘a person that became a “resident” mainly, if not solely, to benefit from the 
treaty.’13 
 
METHODS FOR DEALING WITH TREATY SHOPPING 
 
The OECD commentary recommends various types of provisions which 
countries could incorporate into their Double Taxation Agreements to prevent abuse 
                                                   
9 Oguttu, AW “Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts” 
at 2 
10 OECD Model Tax Convention, Article 1 
11 Sophie Chatel “Treaty Shopping: A Canadian Case Study and the International Scene” at 5 
12 Sophie Chatel “Treaty Shopping: A Canadian Case Study and the International Scene” at 8 












of the treaty through the use of conduit companies.14 These include: the “subject-to-
tax” provision which would provide that the benefits of a treaty in the State of source 
can only be available if the relevant income is subject to tax in the State of residence; 
the “look through” method which does not allow treaty benefits if the company is not 
owned (either directly or indirectly) by residents of the State of which the company is 
resident; the “channel approach” which is a provision that specifies cases of improper 
use with reference to conduit companies; a “limitations of benefits” provision which 
aims at preventing non-resident persons from accessing treaty benefits by using an 
entity that would qualify as a resident of one of the States. 15  Another method 
suggested by the OECD is the “beneficial ownership” provision, which will be 
discussed in more detail. Some countries also rely on provisions in their domestic 
legislation “aimed at combating tax avoidance in general, or on domestic legislation 
specifically aimed at combating treaty shopping.16 For example, Germany has enacted 
domestic anti-treaty shopping legislation, while countries such as Canada and South 
Africa have a general anti-avoidance rule that can be applied to treaty shopping. South 
Africa’s general anti-avoidance rule, ‘inter alia, does not allow a taxpayer to enter 
into a transaction if the sole or main purpose of entering into such transaction is to 
avoid or postpone a South African tax liability’.17 
In the French Supreme Court decision in the Bank of Scotland case, the court 
considered the concept of fraude a la loi in the context of treaty shopping. Fraude a 
la loi is translated to mean legal fraud and ‘refers to any action undertaken with the 
sole purpose of avoiding tax in a way not previously envisaged by the legislator’.18 
This concept has two requirements. The first requirement is that the arrangement must, 
objectively, be contrary to the intention of the legislator. The second requirement is 
that the arrangement must have been designed solely for the purpose of obtaining a 
tax benefit.19 Using this concept, and taking into account the purpose of the relevant 
provision of the treaty, the court came to the conclusion that the treaty could only be 
                                                   
14 Luc De Broe International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse 653-654 
15 Annet Wanyana Oguttu “Curbing ‘treaty shopping’: the ‘beneficial ownership’ provision analysed 
from a South African perspective” (2007) XL CILSA 237 at 242 
16 Sophie Chatel “Treaty Shopping: A Canadian Case Study and the International Scene” at 5 
17 Peter Dachs “South Africa: New withholding tax on dividends” Available at 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/?Page=10&PUBID=35&ISS=24924&SID=710737&TYPE=20 
[Accessed 05/06/2009] 
18 Sophie Chatel “Treaty Shopping: A Canadian Case Study and the International Scene” at 10 













applied to the beneficial owner of the dividend, even where the particular provision 
did not specifically refer to “beneficial ownership”.  
 
 
WHERE DOES BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP COME FROM? 
 
The OECD first included the term “beneficial ownership” in its Model Tax 
Convention in 1977. Articles 10(2), 11(2) and 12(1) are the only articles of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention which aim to deal with treaty abuse and they all contain the 
term “beneficial ownership”. For example, Article 10 dealing with dividends reads as 
follows: 
1. Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting    
State to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that 
other State. 
2. However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of  
which the company paying the dividend is a resident and according to 
the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a 
resident of the other Contracting State , the tax so charged shall not 
exceed: 
(a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial 
owner is a company (other than a partnership) which holds directly 
at least 25 per cent of the capital of the company paying the 
dividends. 
(b) 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases. 
 
Article 10(1) provides that the country which has the right to tax on dividend income  
is the country where the recipient of that income is resident (the same applies to 
interest and royalties under the Model Tax Convention). The effect of Article 10(2) is 
to deny treaty benefits to conduit companies unless the beneficial owner is also a 
resident of one of the contracting states.20  
The OECD Commentary indicates that the term was introduced as an anti-
avoidance provision. The 2003 commentary said that the concept of beneficial 
ownership was introduced into article 10(2) ‘to clarify the interpretation of the words 
‘paid to (…) a resident’ as they are used in paragraph 1 of the article. It makes it clear 
that the State of source is not obliged to give up taxing rights over dividend income 
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merely because that income was immediately received by a resident of a State with 
which the State of source has concluded a convention’.21  
The wording of the OECD Model Convention used to say that the recipient 
must be the beneficial owner. This has subsequently been changed to say that the 
beneficial owner should be a resident of the other contracting State.22 Therefore ‘the 
limitation of tax in the State of source is available even if the beneficial owner is not 
the direct recipient. The direct recipient may be a resident of one or the other 
contracting State or of a third State, provided always that of those involved, only the 
beneficial owner must be a resident of the other contracting State’.23 
While it is clear that the “beneficial ownership” provisions are ‘designed to 
avoid treaty shopping by making use of intermediaries in cases where the beneficial 
owner is not entitled to treaty protection’24, it remains unclear how “beneficial owner” 
is to be interpreted. 
 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE MEANING OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP: 
 
Beneficial ownership is not defined in the OECD Model Tax Convention. It is a 
common law term which was borrowed from the law of the United Kingdom. The 
term has been used in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada for some time, in 
both tax and other legislation.25 There is no such concept as “beneficial ownership” in 
civil law jurisdictions. South African law is a combination of both civil and common 
law. 
Article 3(2) of the OECD model convention provides that where a term is not 
defined in the treaty it should be interpreted in terms of the domestic law meaning in 
the State applying the treaty. This is fine for common law jurisdictions but there is a 
problem in applying this in civil law jurisdictions as many of them do not recognise 
                                                   
21 Luc De Broe International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse 656-657 citing the 2003 
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22 Olivier p474 
23 OECD Commentary 722 
24 Klaus Vogel Double Taxation Conventions 3 ed (1999) 597 













the concept of beneficial ownership and therefore have no domestic law meaning to 
work from.26  
Articles 10, 11 & 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention which all use the 
concept of beneficial ownership, deal with dividends, interest and royalties, 
respectively. These articles provide for a reduced level of withholding tax on the 
relevant type of income. 27  ‘Hence, the beneficial ownership limitation…is a 
restriction on the availability of the reduced tax rate.’28 To qualify for this reduced 
rate the beneficial owner of the income must be a resident of one of the Contracting 
States. Taxing rights are granted to the place of residence of the beneficial owner, 
however the source country still has limited taxing rights and “may” tax as well, 
depending where the beneficial owner is.  
 
Domestic Law Meaning vs International Meaning 
When interpreting “beneficial ownership” many authors disagree on whether 
the term should be interpreted in terms of domestic law or should be given an 
independent treaty meaning. As the concept was borrowed from common law systems, 
civil law systems do not have a domestic definition to fall back on. Vogel argues that 
it cannot be interpreted in terms of domestic law because ‘none of the national tax 
systems in question offer a precise definition…’ 29  He argues that “beneficial 
ownership” should be interpreted in its treaty context, taking into account the 
‘purpose pursued by the restriction’30 
Another argument is that domestic law is in some sense relevant, because the 
term was originally borrowed from common law systems and it should be interpreted 
with these domestic law definitions in mind. Some argue that ‘the common law states 
represent the source that the term was taken from, and the meaning in those states 
should be taken as the starting point for interpretation in terms of the Vienna 
Convention. 31  The meaning in common law states should then be modified, if 
                                                   
26 “Structuring international transactions in Ireland”, Available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,cid%3D100997%26pv%3DY,00.html [Accessed on 
02/06/2009] 
27 Philip Baker, Beneficial ownership: After Indofood 15, Available at 
www.taxbar.com/documents/Beneficial_Ownership.PB.pdf,  [Accessed on 02 June 2009 ] 
28 Ibid 15 
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necessary, in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose.’32 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention applies to international treaties and reads as 
follows: 
 
‘1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its objects and purpose.’33 
 
Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention goes on to say that ‘A special meaning shall 
be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended’.34 
The argument for the use of domestic law is supported by Article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model Convention, which states that where there is no definition of a term in a 
tax treaty, the interpreter should use the meaning used in the domestic law of the State 
applying the term, to the extent that the treaty context does not require otherwise.35  
De Broe argues that domestic law should not be used to define “beneficial 
ownership” due to the fact that in many cases ‘there is not such meaning, and where 
there is one, the context of the treaty requires not to use the domestic law meaning.’36 
Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention states that: 
‘2.The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty.’37 
 
This could be what De Broe means when he refers to the context of the treaty. De 
Broe suggests that the term “beneficial ownership” has an autonomous treaty meaning. 
One reason for this view is that if the domestic law meaning is to be used by a civil 
law State it can lead to inappropriate results. Using Belgium as an example, authors 
have argued that in terms of Article 3(2) the term should be interpreted according to 
Belgian private law. However, the term has no meaning in Belgian private law so the 
authors say that the classical interpretation of “legal ownership” should be applied. 
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34 Ibid 
35 Luc De Broe International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse at 667 
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This means that an agent or nominee who holds title for a principal who receives all 
the benefit would be a beneficial owner, which clearly negates the purpose of 
introducing the concept of beneficial ownership in the first place.38  
The OECD commentary appears to support the view that beneficial ownership 
be given a “treaty meaning” rather than a domestic law meaning. The OECD 
Commentary to Article 10 states that: 
‘The term ‘beneficial owner’ is not used in a narrow technical sense, rather, it 
should be understood in its context and in light of the object and purposes of 
the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of 
fiscal evasion and avoidance.’39  
 
De Broe argues that there are many reasons why the domestic law meaning 
should not be used even in common law jurisdictions where there is a domestic law 
meaning. He argues that:  
‘where the treaty contains in itself a provision to counter its improper use, the 
prevention of such use should as much as possible be achieved through the 
common interpretation of that term between the two Contracting States and, 
more in general, through a uniform interpretation by all States that include 
such a term in their tax treaties with a view to avoid such treaty to be 
shopped… If one leaves it to each State to define the term “beneficial owner” 
through recourse to its domestic law, there may be a significant risk that the 
meaning emerging from domestic law goes well beyond the ordinary meaning 
of the term used in the treaty… If it is left to each State to construe the term 
under its domestic law, one abandons the principle of reciprocity, a 
fundamental cornerstone on which each tax treaty is built, and no longer 
strives to achieve a uniform application and interpretation of tax treaties, 
which is one of the goals pursued by the OECD.’40 
 
One of the issues with interpreting this concept is how broadly it should be 
interpreted, i.e. ‘how artificial must the conduit arrangement have been for the benefit 
of the treaty to be denied?’41  
The OECD Commentary attempts to clarify the meaning of beneficial 
ownership in the following paragraph by showing the difference between a recipient 
who hold on behalf of the beneficial owner and the beneficial owner itself: 
‘The immediate recipient of the income in this situation qualifies as a resident 
but no potential double taxation arises as a consequence of that status since the 
recipient is not treated as the owner of the income for tax purposes in the State 
of residence. It would be equally inconsistent with the object and purpose of 
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the Convention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption where a 
resident of a Contracting State, otherwise than through an agency or nominee 
relationship, simply acts as a conduit for another person who in fact receives 
the benefit of the income concerned. For these reasons, the report from the 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled "Double Taxation Conventions and the 
Use of Conduit Companies" concludes that a conduit company cannot 
normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though the formal owner, it 
has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it, in relation to 
the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of 
the interested parties.’ 
 
The meaning of beneficial ownership was considered in the case of Indofood 
International Finance v JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., London Branch42. This was not 
a tax case but a civil litigation suit. The case was between two parties to a loan 
agreement. The facts of the case were that an Indonesian company wanted to raise a 
loan but if it had done so directly there would have been a 20 per cent withholding tax 
on the interest. So the Indonesian company established a subsidiary in Mauritius, 
which then issued the loan, thus benefiting from the Indonesian Tax Treaty with 
Mauritius which allowed a reduced withholding tax of 10 per cent. The Indonesia-
Mauritius Tax Treaty was subsequently terminated which meant that the withholding 
tax on the interest would revert back to 20 per cent. The loan agreement provided that 
if no reasonable steps could be taken to revert to the reduced withholding tax, that the 
borrower could repay the loan early. Indofood alleged that there were no such 
reasonable steps that could be taken, whilst JP Morgan (wanting the loan to remain in 
place) proposed that a Dutch company be set up to take advantage of the Indonesia-
Netherlands Tax Treaty, which also had a 10 per cent withholding tax on interest.  
The issue was whether ‘a newly interposed Dutch company would be the 
“beneficial owner” of the interest as required under the “Interest” Article of the 
Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty, ie would the Dutch company be entitled to the 
reduced withholding tax under the Indonesia-Netherlands treaty. The court had to 
decide whether the Dutch company would be viewed as the beneficial owner from an 
Indonesian perspective. 
 The court held that the OECD commentary together with expert opinion 
showed that the term “beneficial owner” should be given an ‘international fiscal 
                                                   













meaning not derived from the domestic laws of contracting states’43. The court further 
stated that the meaning of the term ‘is plainly not to be limited by a technical and 
legal approach. Regard is to be had to the substance of the matter…’ The court of 
appeal based its reasoning on whether the recipient enjoyed the full privilege of the 
interest or whether it was simply an administrator of the income. This case led to 
much concern about ‘the possibility that while [certain] structures may be fine under 
domestic law, they may fail the international test.’44  
In 2008, in the case of Prévost Car Inc v Her Majesty the Queen45 , the 
Canadian Tax Court had to interpret the term “beneficial ownership” with regards to 
Article 10(2) of the Double Taxation Agreement between Canada and the Netherlands. 
The court had to decide whether a Netherlands holding company was the beneficial 
owner of dividends paid by its Canadian subsidiary. The only issue before the court 
was the meaning of “beneficial owner” in the treaty between Canada and the 
Netherlands.  










The court took note of the OECD commentary on which Article 10(2) of the 
Canada-Netherlands Treaty was based. The Court found that ‘the “beneficial owner” 
of dividends is the person who receives the dividends for his or her own use and 
enjoyment and assumes the risk and control of the dividend he or she received. The 
person who is the beneficial owner of the dividend is the person who enjoys and 
assumes all the attributes of ownership’.46 The tax court found that the Netherlands 
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158 at 42 
44 www.cgsh.com/files.... 
45 2008 DTC 3080 (TCC) para [100] 
46 Prevost Car Inc The Queen 2008 DTC 3080 (TCC) at [100] 
SWEDEN CO UK CO 
NETHERLANDS 
– Prevost Hold Co 
CANADA 













holding company was the beneficial owner of the dividends. The case went on appeal 
to the Federal Court of Appeal 47  where the court rejected the argument that 
“beneficial ownership” should have an international fiscal meaning, thus rejecting the 
finding in the Indofood case. The court upheld the finding of the Tax Court and 
emphasised that when interpreting tax treaties the OECD Commentaries, including 
revisions made after a tax treaty is signed, and the OECD Conduit Companies Report, 
should be taken into account.   
In determining whether a company is merely a conduit company which is not 
the beneficial owner of specific income one should look at whether the company has 
any discretion as to the subsequent use of the income. The court a quo in the Prévost 
Car case said that ‘one does not pierce the corporate veil unless the corporation is a 
conduit for another person and has absolutely no discretion as to the use or application 
of the funds put through it as conduit.’48   
China recently issued a circular to provide guidance as to the meaning of 
beneficial ownership, as used in many of China’s double taxation agreements 
regarding passive income. The circular defines the beneficial owner as ‘the person 
who has ownership and control over the income or the rights or assets that generates 
such income’. According to the circular the beneficial owner could be an individual or 
any kind of corporation or organisation. The beneficial owner would ‘engage in 
“substantive business activities” [such as] manufacturing, trading and management 
activities’.49 The circular goes on to say that the term should be interpreted in the light 
of the facts and circumstances of each case and in accordance with the principle of 
substance over form. Factors that indicate against a particular entity being the 
beneficial owner include:  
∑ if the resident is obligated to pay or distribute a large portion or all of 
the income within a specific timeframe. 
∑ Where the resident is a corporation and is assets, operations and 
employees are few and not commensurate with the amount of income 
∑ Where the resident has no or almost no controlling rights on overt the 
income or assets or rights that generate the income and bears little or 
no risk 
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∑ The other treaty country does not tax or exempts the income, or taxes it 
at a very low rate… 50 
The circular specifies that agents and conduit companies cannot be beneficial owners. 
 
THE CONCEPT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
South Africa has included the beneficial ownership provisions recommended 
by the OECD in some of its Double Taxation Agreements.  Up to now, the beneficial 
ownership provisions have not been particularly advantageous from a South African 
perspective as South Africa did not impose withholding taxes on dividends and 
interest earned by non-residents which have their source in South Africa.51 South 
Africa has recently made the decision to introduce a withholding tax on dividends 
which is expected to come into operation in 2010. As a result of this decision many of 
South Africa’s Double Taxation Agreements have been renegotiated to include a 
reduced withholding tax on dividends, for example the Double Taxation Agreement 
with The Netherlands, which now provides for a 5 per cent withholding tax on 
dividends.52 
South African company law uses the term “beneficial ownership” with respect 
to ownership of shares. The beneficial owner of shares is not necessarily the same as 
the registered owner. For example, ‘a member could…sell or cede the rights attaching 
to the shares by passing “the property” in them to a purchaser who may not be 
registered as a member of the company. The purchaser owns the shares whereas the 
seller is the member of the company and he alone (the seller) can enforce the rights 
attaching to the shares against the company (but this he does in the interest of the 
purchaser).’53 The purchaser would be the “beneficial owner”. 
Article 3(2) states that the meaning of the term contained in domestic tax laws 
must prevail over the meaning given in any other domestic law. Up to now the term 
“beneficial owner” has not been used in the South African Income Tax Act (“the 
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Act”), however, the term is used in the new dividend withholding tax provisions in the 
Act, which have not yet come into effect. In the definitions section of Part VII of the 
Act, “beneficial owner” is defined as meaning ‘the person entitled to the benefit of the 
dividend attaching to a share’ 54 . This definition appears to have a very similar 
meaning to the company law meaning. Thus the company law meaning would 
probably be persuasive if interpreting the term in accordance with South African 
domestic legislation. The lack of a good domestic definition highlights the difficulties 
in interpreting the term in the treaty in accordance with Article 3(2). Perhaps South 
Africa, and other countries, should take note of this problem and should include a 
definition of beneficial ownership in its domestic tax legislation. But while the 
problem still exists, the argument for an international, “treaty meaning” of the term is 
strengthened.  
Perhaps the solution is that countries concluding Double Taxation Agreements 
should include a definition of beneficial ownership that will apply to the individual 
treaty, which is agreed upon by both contracting States. ‘The first ever treaty 
definition of the term is to be found in Germany’s DTC with USA [in] 1989’.55 
One can also argue that because our tax treaties become incorporated into the 
Income Tax Act through the operation of s 108(2) read with s 231 of the Constitution 
of South Africa, they are part of our domestic law and should thus be interpreted in 
accordance with our domestic laws, specifically our Income Tax Act, in keeping with 
article 3(2). In this regard it would be helpful if a definition of beneficial ownership 
were included in the Income Tax Act, which can be used in interpreting the term in 
South African Double Taxation Agreements.  
Maybe one cannot impose an “international meaning” for the term “beneficial 
ownership” onto all Double Taxation Agreements. In certain circumstances an 
“international meaning” may be more appropriate, such as where there is no domestic 
law meaning of the term in a particular State. However, a Double Taxation 
Agreement is an agreement between two individual States, and where they omit to 
include a specific definition in the treaty, it would seem that the domestic law 
meaning should at least be taken into account when interpreting the term, alongside 
the OECD commentary as was done in the Prévost Car case. The concept of 
beneficial ownership can be a useful tool in curbing treaty shopping once the problem 
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of interpretation has been resolved. It seems clear, taking into account international 
case law and the OECD commentaries and domestic law meanings from common law 
jurisdictions, that nominees, agents and conduit companies with little to no discretion 
in dealing with the income would not be considered the beneficial owners of income. 
It is unlikely that the term could be interpreted more widely than that. The most 
effective solution for the problem of determining the beneficial owner would be if 
states could define the term in the Double Taxation Agreement itself, so that it does in 
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